

21 May 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: [] Special Assistant to the DDCI

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FROM : []
Chief, Europe Branch
Current Support Division
Office of Soviet Analysis

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SUBJECT : Production of the President's Report
on US and Soviet Forces

1. The cancellation of Admiral Inman's breakfast today with Mr. Carlucci precluded discussion of the DoD's participation in the President's Report. Someone from CIA needs to have Mr. McFarlane on the NSC Staff or a high-level DoD official direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Fred C. Ikle, to proceed immediately with the US forces sections on the Report. []

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2. The next edition, which will cover the nine-month period ending 30 June, is to be available for President Reagan in mid-July. The DDI team already has prepared a draft on Soviet forces and will circulate another on 1 June for Community coordination. Graphics work is also under way. The Office of Net Assessment in DoD has, however, recommended once again to Mr. Ikle that the joint report be terminated and that they not work on it unless directed to do so by the NSC. Mr. Ikle supported this view and sent a memorandum to Mr. Sven Kramer, a junior member of the NSC Staff who did not respond. DoD apparently has taken this as NSC concurrence. []

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3. Subsequent contacts by [] OCPAS, with Judge Clark and Mr. McFarlane indicated that the President and the NSC Staff still want to receive the joint report. Mr. McFarlane has been reminded several times of the need for him to write a letter to Mr. Ikle, who has indicated that no action on the Report will be taken until the NSC or higher officials in the Pentagon direct it. []

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4. In the past, it has taken the DoD and CIA teams about three months to publish the Report. We now have approximately seven weeks left before the deadline. The DoD manager of the US sections for the Report says he believes he can still meet the deadline if he is allowed to begin next week. If not, the quality of the material presented on US forces will suffer noticeably or the entire process will unravel. If the Report is to be published without US sections, we need to begin redesigning it immediately. []

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5. Unlike the National Estimates and other Community publications, this report has never missed its deadline and has always been available for the President within two weeks of its information cutoff date. The Report originated in 1969 when the President asked the DCI for a quarterly review of

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Soviet strategic forces. Successive administrations have asked for the inclusion of theater forces or special topical sections. The Report reached its present form two years ago when the President's National Security Advisor requested that it include US forces. The Office of Net Assessment in the Department of Defense provides the text and graphic material on US systems for the Report, which is still produced by the Central Intelligence Agency. CIA is also responsible for the layout and design of the Report as well as the general comparability of the data on both forces. Both the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence review the Report before it is published. [REDACTED]

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6. The DoD recommendation against the Report is not well founded. The Office of Net Assessment wants to rely on the Joint Net Assessment that it is now preparing with the NIO/SP as the policymaker's single guide for comparing forces. It is interesting that the Pentagon's complaints center around the book not being organized to perform net assessment, a function we have been careful to avoid and one that the Pentagon has insisted the book should not perform. The Report allows the reader to get a feel for the relative level of effort each side places in similar programs but never has pretended to provide a basis for net assessment. Moreover, the net assessment being prepared with the NIO/SP would not include conventional forces. Without a joint PR, there would be no agreed comparison of this sort available to the NSC. The Office of Net Assessment has also complained that the Report's time frame is too short to be useful for force planning. The Report is not intended, however, to support such an effort. [REDACTED]

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7. The limited feedback we receive has indicated that recipients find the Report quite valuable. It accomplishes its purpose of providing basic information on both US and Soviet forces as well as highlighting recent trends and developments and future changes. [REDACTED]

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